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Comments 
EXPLOITING DREAMS: H-1B VISA FRAUD, ITS 
EFFECTS, AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Jessica F. Rosenbaum* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to a 2008 report by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, which brought to the fore rampant fraud in the H-1B visa 
program, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) remarked:  “The results of this 
report validate exactly what I‟ve been fearful of—some employers are 
bringing H-1B visa holders into our country with complete disregard for 
the law. . . .  The fraud and abuse outlined in this report shows that it‟s time 
to put some needed reform in place.”
1
  The Senator‟s commentary reflected 
the proliferating view that the H-1B visa program is a system fraught with 
abuse and fraud and is ripe for reform.  This prevalence of fraud in the H-
1B visa program can, in large part, be attributed to a lack of governmental 
oversight. 
Unfortunately, insufficient oversight authority has been a dilemma 
confronting many government agencies in recent years.  A case in point:  
despite numerous red flags and tip-offs, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) ignored warnings while Bernard Madoff engaged in 
“the most complex and sinister fraud in American history[.]”
2
  In his 
 
 *  Senior Editor, Journal of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Questions Agency About Fraud in 
H-1B Program (Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm? 
customel_dataPageID_1502=17678. 
 2. See Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME.COM (Feb. 4, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html (discussing the 
testimony of Harry Markopolos, who allegedly tipped off the SEC about suspected 
securities fraud by Madoff, before the House Financial Services Committee). 
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testimony before the House Financial Services Committee in February 
2009, Harry Markopolos opined that the SEC‟s failure to investigate 
Madoff‟s crooked returns was “equivalent to a major league baseball player 
batting .966 and no one suspecting that this player was cheating[.]”
3
  An 
investigation conducted by the SEC‟s inspector general confirmed that the 
regulators assigned to oversee Wall Street clearly dropped the ball in 
repeatedly failing to uncover Madoff‟s historic scam.
4
 
Unfortunately, the SEC has not been the only regulatory agency 
recently accused of “dropping the ball.”  The National Transportation 
Safety Board‟s (“NTSB”) probe of the February 12, 2009 Colgan Air 
accident near Buffalo, New York, which killed fifty people, uncovered a 
myriad of weaknesses in pilot training and hiring practices.
5
  The NTSB 
criticized the regional airline industry for employing inadequately trained 
pilots with too little experience, who suffer from fatigue and are paid low 
wages.
6
  Regarding the FAA‟s oversight of regional airlines, the NTSB 
concluded:  “[T]he current FAA surveillance standards for oversight at air 
carriers undergoing rapid growth and increased complexity of operations 
do not guarantee that any challenges encountered by the carriers as a result 
of these changes will be appropriately mitigated.”
7
 
In addition to the SEC and NTSB, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has also been reprehended for its lack 
of oversight.  In early 2010, NHTSA sustained intense criticism for its slow 
response to complaints about defects in Toyota vehicles, which in 
documented cases compromised consumer safety.  The massive recalls that 
occurred prompted Congress to reconsider whether the agency has lived up 
to its mission of protecting motorists.
8
  Whether in regard to automobiles, 
airplanes, or investors, there appears to be a general consensus that 
increased governmental regulation is indeed necessary. 
 
 3. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (testimony of Henry Markopolos, CFA, 
CFE), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/markopolos020409.pdf. 
 4. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, CASE NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF 
FAILURE TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF‟S PONZI SCHEME (2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509-exec-summary.pdf. 
 5. Lisa Stark and Huma Khan, Pilot Error to Blame in Deadly Flight Accident Last 
February, ABC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Travel/ntsb-pilot-error-
blame-colgan-air-flight-3407/story?id=9726879. 
 6. Id. 
 7. NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 139 (2010), available at 
http://ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.pdf. 
 8. Toyota Woes Put Spotlight on Fed Oversight, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/11/toyota-woes-put-
spotlight-fed-oversight/. 
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While current reform proposals regarding the H-1B program, 
specifically the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009, make considerable 
headway, this Comment argues that the proposals do not go far enough 
with respect to oversight authority.  Part II of the Comment sets forth 
pertinent aspects of and reforms to the Immigration and Nationality Act, of 
which the H-1B visa program is part.  Part III provides an overview of the 
H-1B visa program as it exists in its current form.  Part IV describes 
contemporary safeguards in the H-1B visa system, and Part V goes on to 
discuss the shortcomings and rampant abuse in the system despite these 
safeguards.  Part VI discusses past and current reform proposals, with 
particular emphasis on the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009.  This 
section also presents the ongoing debate over the H-1B visa cap, as well as 
economic and legislative hurdles confronted by employers seeking to hire 
H-1B workers.  Taking into account various aspects of the reform 
proposals, Part VII advocates particular measures that this author believes 
are essential components of comprehensive reform. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The original version of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
was passed in 1952 to govern immigration to, and citizenship in, the United 
States.
9
  The INA stands alone as a body of law, and is also contained in 
various sections of Title 8 of the United States Code.
10
  Important reforms 
to the INA were enacted in 1965, at which point the national origins quota 
system, which had governed admission into the United States previously, 
was replaced by a system focused on family reunification and the desire to 
obtain a skilled workforce.
11
  Additionally, the 1965 Amendments 
increased the annual ceiling on immigrants.
12
  Immediate relatives of 
American citizens were not included in this ceiling.
13
  Highest preference 
was given to the relatives of American citizens and permanent resident 
aliens, followed by applicants with special job skills.
14
  Over the next two 
decades, there were additional amendments to the INA that altered 
 
 9. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Immigration and Nationality Act, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Laws” hyperlink; then follow “Immigration 
Nationality Act” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 10. Id. 
 11. CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy 
of the 1965 Immigration Act (Sept. 1995), http://www.cis.org/articles/1995/back395.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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immigration quotas.
15
  Concurrent with these legislative changes was an 
evolution in U.S. policy toward a focus on rooting out refugees and illegal 
aliens.
16
 
The most significant change regarding employment-related 
immigration came with the 1990 Immigration Act (“IMMACT”).  The goal 
of this legislation was “to help American businesses hire highly skilled, 
specially trained personnel to fill increasingly sophisticated jobs for which 
domestic personnel cannot be found.”
17
  It was as a result of this Act that 
the H-1B visa category was born. 
III.  THE H-1B VISA PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 
A.   Legislation 
The H-1B visa program allows American employers to temporarily 
employ non-immigrant aliens to perform specialized occupations in the 
United States.
18
  According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, a 
“specialty occupation” is an occupation that requires:  (1) theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge; and (2) 
attainment of a bachelor‟s or higher degree in the specific specialty.
19
  
Congress first implemented an annual cap on the number of H-1B visas in 
the 1990 Immigration Act, which set the limit at 65,000.
20
  Due to high 
demand for H-1B workers that corresponded with the dot-com bubble, 
Congress provided for an increase in the cap between 1999 and 2003.
21
  In 
the fiscal year 2004, the cap returned to 65,000, and has remained at that 
level ever since.
22
 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (establishing a separate 
admissions policy for refugees, and setting a separate target for refugees at 50,000); see also 
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) 
(attempting to control and deter illegal immigration); THE SELECT COMMISSION ON 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, ED211612, FINAL REPORT (1981) (reviewing the 
provisions and effects of the INA, with particular focus on illegal immigrants and refugees). 
 17. Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897 (Nov. 29, 1991). 
 18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2006). 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i) (2006). 
 20. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 205(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5019-22. 
 21. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY, U.S. DEP‟T OF COMMERCE, ED412360, 
AMERICA‟S NEW DEFICIT:  THE SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY WORKERS (1997), 
available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSear
ch_SearchValue_0=ED412360&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED412360 
(discussing the potential shortage of information technology workers in the U.S. due to the 
possibility that the nation‟s education system would not be able to train enough of these 
workers to meet the growing demand). 
 22. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (2006).  The 65,000 cap does not include an additional 20,000 
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B.  Logistics 
In order to hire an H-1B non-immigrant alien, an employer must file a 
Labor Condition Application (“LCA”) with the U.S. Department of Labor 
(“DOL”).
23
  The LCA must include the number of employees to be hired, 
their occupational classification, the actual wage rate, the prevailing wage 
rate, the source of the wage data, the duration of employment, and the date 
of need.
24
  Employers are required to pay H-1B visa workers either the 
same wage as paid to other employees with similar skills and 
qualifications, or the “prevailing wage” for that occupation and location, 
whichever is higher.
25
  The employer must also file an H-1B visa petition 
with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).
26
  The DOL 
must certify both the LCA and petition, which are then sent to the 
Department of Homeland Security for approval.
27
 
The initial stay for an H-1B visa worker in the United States is three 
years, but can be extended to a maximum of six years.
28
  Unlike other non-
immigrant visa categories, the H-1B category permits dual intent:  workers 
coming to the U.S. need not avow their intent to leave the country once 
their visa has expired.  Accordingly, H-1B visa holders can pursue 
permanent residence.
29
 
IV.  SAFEGUARDS IN THE SYSTEM 
Most of the safeguards in the present H-1B visa program have been 
implemented in response to critics‟ arguments that the system displaces 
American workers from U.S. jobs.  The annual H-1B visa cap of 65,000, 
which has been in place since 2004, represents somewhat of a compromise 
between critics and advocates of the program, though definitive lines in the 
 
H-1B visas granted to individuals with U.S. graduate degrees, who are statutorily exempted 
from the cap under the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004.  H.R. 4818, 108th Cong. § 425 
(2004). 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (2006). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2006). 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006).  On March 1, 2003, the Department of 
Homeland Security took over all functions and authorities of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (which previously had been responsible for approving LCAs and 
petitions) under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security 
Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002.  Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 402, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2178 (2002). 
 28. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(g),(k) (2006). 
 29. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(h) (2006). 
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debate over the cap are difficult to discern.
30
 
Another safeguard to protect American workers is the “H-1B 
dependent” designation of certain employers who have workforces 
consisting of 15% or more H-1B workers.  The “H-1B dependent” category 
developed out of the American Competitiveness and Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1998 (“ACWIA 98”), which implemented reforms to 
the INA.
31
  As defined by ACWIA 98, an “H-1B dependent employer” is 
an employer that:  (1) has twenty-five or fewer full-time employees who 
are employed in the United States and employs more than seven H-1B non-
immigrants; (2) has between twenty-six and fifty full-time employees who 
are employed in the United States and employs more than twelve H-1B 
non-immigrants; or (3) has at least fifty-one full-time employees who are 
employed in the U.S. and H-1B non-immigrants make up at least 15% of 
that workforce.
32
   
H-1B dependent employers are subject to more stringent regulations.  
ACWIA 98, in a section titled “Protection Against Displacement of United 
States Workers in Case of H-1B-Dependent Employers,” limits an H-1B 
dependent employer‟s ability to transfer an H-1B worker to another 
employer, requires that employers certify in the LCA that they have not and 
will not displace American workers, and obliges employers to take steps to 
recruit American workers who are equally or better qualified for the 
position for which an H-1B worker is sought.
33
  ACWIA 98 also increased 
penalties for violations of the INA and mandated that the National Science 
Foundation study the impact of the H-1B visa program and keep Congress 
abreast of its findings.
34
  Since the enactment of ACWIA 98, a number of 
fees have been added to the H-1B visa application process as an additional 
method of deterring abuse of the system and protecting American 
workers.
35
 
 
 30. Courtney L. Cromwell, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market: Why Congress 
Should Raise or Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 455 
(2009).  See infra Part VI for discussion on the debate regarding the visa cap. 
 31. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title IV, § 412, 112 Stat. 2681-642, 642-5 (1998). 
 32. Id. at § 412(b). 
 33. Id. at §§ 412(a)(1)(E)-(G). 
 34. Id. at §§ 413, 417, 418. 
 35. See Pub. L. No. 106-311, 114 Stat. 1247 (2000) (increasing the petitioner fee from 
$500 to $1000); H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, §§ 422, 426, 118 
Stat. 2809, 3353, 3357 (2004) (raising the petitioner fee to $1500 and implementing a $500 
fraud prevention and detection fee for H-1B applications).  See also infra Part VI.D for 
additional discussion regarding filing fees. 
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V.  A SYSTEM RIFE WITH FRAUD AND ABUSE 
In September 2008, USCIS released a report on its findings regarding 
the prevalence of fraud in H-1B petitions.  The study examined 246 
petitions filed between October 1, 2005 and March 31, 2006.
36
  The results 
revealed that 51 petitions out of the 246 that were analyzed were 
fraudulent, or contained at least one technical violation.
37
  When these 
numbers were extrapolated to evaluate the total number of applications 
filed during this period, it was estimated that the number of violations 
could actually range from 15,500 to 25,600.
38
 
One of the most blatant misrepresentations cited in the USCIS study 
involved a case in which the employee was performing duties significantly 
different from those described in the LCA and petition.  In that case, the 
position described in the petition and LCA was that of a business 
development analyst, but the employer later admitted to USCIS that the 
employee would be working in a laundromat doing laundry and 
maintaining washing machines.
39
  Other misrepresentations included 
businesses that did not exist, educational degrees that were fraudulent, and 
signatures that had been forged.
40
 
A.   Administrative Loopholes 
It is the opinion of this author that the problems in the H-1B system 
are perpetuated by a lack of oversight.
41
  The Labor Condition Application 
is the primary way the DOL regulates the H-1B program.  According to 
one critic, “the LCA system has been nothing more than a paper-shuffling 
process” since the DOL ordinarily accepts the employer‟s statement of the 
truthfulness of the application without independently verifying its 
contents.
42
  The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducted 
interviews of H-1B employers, and reported:  “Some employers said that 
 
 36. The total number of petitions filed during this period was 96,827.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., H-1B BENEFIT FRAUD & COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT 5 (Sept. 
2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/H-1B_BFCA_20sep08.pdf. 
 37. 33 cases (13.4%) were fraudulent, and 18 cases (7.3%) contained technical 
violations.  Hence, the overall violation rate in the 246 cases analyzed was 20.7%.  Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. at n.9. 
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See infra Part VII for a proposal to increase the oversight authority of the federal 
government. 
 42. John Miano, The Bottom of the Pay Scale: Wages for H-1B Computer 
Programmers, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, 1, 4 (Dec. 2005), 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1305.pdf. 
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they hired H-1B workers in part because these workers would often accept 
lower salaries than similarly qualified U.S. workers; however, these 
employers said they never paid H-1B workers less than the required 
wage.”
43
  Many of the problems associated with implementing the 
prevailing wage occur because of the limited oversight role of the DOL.  
The DOL‟s Office of Inspector General has described the LCA certification 
process as merely a “rubber stamp” of the employer‟s application.
44
  The 
LCA review process is completely automated, and the employer is not 
required to submit any supporting documentation.  The GAO has 
concluded that “as the [H-1B] program currently operates, the goals of 
preventing abuse of the program and providing efficient services to 
employers and workers are not being achieved.  Limited by the law, 
Labor‟s review of the LCA is perfunctory and adds little assurance that 
labor conditions employers attest to actually exist.”
45
 
The DOL is only authorized to review an employer‟s attestation of the 
truthfulness of the LCA for “completeness and obvious inaccuracies.”
46
  
The Department does not have the authority to open an investigation of an 
employer suspected of abusing the system unless it receives a formal 
complaint.  Even if a complaint is filed, the Secretary of Labor must 
personally authorize an investigation.
47
  Many proposals to curb abuse of 
the H-1B system focus on these shortcomings, and advocate expanding the 
oversight role of the DOL.
48
 
B. Body Shops 
In an October 2009 cover article for Business Week magazine entitled 
America’s High-Tech Sweatshops, Moira Herbst and Steve Hamm shed 
light on some of the most egregious abuses of the H-1B program.
49
  
 
 43. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-883, H-1B FOREIGN WORKERS: 
BETTER TRACKING NEEDED TO HELP DETERMINE H-1B PROGRAM‟S EFFECTS ON U.S. 
WORKFORCE i, 4 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf. 
 44. Statement of Charles C. Masten, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servs., Educ. and Related Agencies of the H. 
Comm. On Appropriations, 105th Cong. 11 (1997), available at 
http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/testimony/19970410.pdf. 
 45. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-157, H-1B FOREIGN 
WORKERS:  BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED TO HELP EMPLOYERS AND PROTECT WORKERS 34 
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00157.pdf. 
 46. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(t)(2)(C) (2006). 
 47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Labor to establish a 
process for receiving and investigating complaints). 
 48. See infra Part VI and Part VII for a discussion of past and current proposals. 
 49. Steve Hamm and Moira Herbst, America’s High-Tech Sweatshops, BUSINESS WEEK, 
Oct. 12, 2009, at 34. 
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Specifically, the authors point to “body shops,” small labor suppliers that 
have thrived in recent years due to cost-cutting pressures in the U.S. 
economy.  Because of these pressures, large companies look to outsourcers 
to supply them with workers for their technological operations.  Rather 
than employing a fixed staff that is either idle or overloaded at any point in 
time, companies pay outsourcers to supply the desired amount of labor.  
Outsourcing permits companies to convert the fixed costs of salaried 
employees into the variable costs of a contingent, as-needed workforce 
comprised of outsourced workers.  Hence, the business can closely match 
costs and revenues, and can better insulate its bottom line from fluctuations 
caused by the ability to cover fixed costs.
50
 
In order to keep costs low, the outsourcers maintain a lean workforce 
at each of their client‟s sites, and then turn to body shops if additional labor 
is required.  The outsourcing firms and body shops rely heavily on foreign 
employees who come to the United States on temporary visas, such as the 
H-1B.
51
  The employee works for the body shop, which in turn supplies the 
outsourcers, which then supply the company, the ultimate user of the labor.  
The number of layers in this type of system creates a breeding ground for 
fraud and abuse. 
C.   Present and Prior Litigation 
H-1B visa fraud has been an issue in the spotlight recently as lawsuits 
have been brought against employers, and more specifically, against body 
shops.  In February 2009, Vision Systems Group, an information 
technology services firm, was indicted on ten federal counts for allegedly 
using fraudulent documents to bring H-1B workers into the United States.
52
  
The indictment was later expanded to eighteen counts,
53
 including a charge 
for violating the INA requirement that employers pay H-1B visa workers 
the prevailing wage for a particular occupation in a particular location.  
Vision Systems, based in New Jersey, set up a branch office in Iowa.  The 
company claimed that many of its H-1B employees were working in Iowa, 
where the wage rate is significantly lower than in New Jersey, where the 
company‟s headquarters are located.
54
 
 
 50. Cost-Volume-Profit and Business Scalability, PRINCIPLESOFACCOUNTING.COM, 
http://www.principlesofaccounting.com/chapter%2018.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 51. Hamm and Herbst, supra note 49, at 37. 
 52. Media Release, U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Iowa, 11 
Arrested, Indicted in Multi-state Operation Targeting Visa and Mail Fraud (Feb. 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/11arrestedmultivisafraud02feb09.pdf. 
 53. Patrick Thibodeau, U.S. Expands H-1B Fraud Case Against N.J. Firm, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/342686. 
 54. Id.  Accord Moira Herbst, Visa Fraud Sparks Arrests Nationwide, BUSINESS WEEK 
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In one of the only legal cases involving an employer‟s failure to 
comply with the H-1B visa program requirements, the DOL decided in 
favor of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, acting on behalf 
of an H-1B visa worker.
55
  Itek Consulting was found guilty of violating the 
INA requirement that H-1B visa workers be paid beginning on the date on 
which employment commences, for both productive and non-productive 
time.
56
  Although an employer need not pay wages to an H-1B worker in 
non-productive status due to conditions unrelated to employment or which 
render the employee unable to work, payment of the prevailing wage is 
required during employment-related non-productive time.
57
  The 
Administrative Law Judge determined that Itek had engaged in illegal 
“benching” of an H-1B non-immigrant when it placed the employee on 
non-productive status without pay.
58
 
VI.  PAST AND CURRENT REFORMS 
In recent years, Congress considered a number of H-1B reform bills 
that were never enacted into law.  These include:  the Defend the American 
Dream Act of 2005; the USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005;
59
 the Secure 
Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007;
60
 
the H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 2007; and the 
H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009. 
A.   Prior Legislation 
The Defend the American Dream Act of 2005 set more definite 
guidelines for wage determination than had previously existed.
61
  The Act 
implemented further safeguards to protect American workers, and provided 
stringent notice requirements for employers seeking H-1B visas.
62
  
Additionally, the bill tripled H-1B application fees, increased the Secretary 
 
ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db20090212_920784.htm 
(discussing the federal investigation into suspected visa fraud engaged in by Vision Systems 
Group). 
 55. Adm‟r, Wage & Hour Div. v. Itek Consulting, Inc., 2008-LCA-00046 (Dep‟t of 
Labor May 6, 2009). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(c)(vii) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(ii). 
 58. Itek Consulting, 2008-LCA-00046, at 12. 
 59. USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3322, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 60. Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 
1639, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 61. H.R. 4378, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). 
 62. Id. at §§ 3-4. 
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of Labor‟s oversight function, and provided a private right of action for 
employees harmed by violations of the INA.
63
  Similar ideas were set forth 
in the USA Jobs Protection Act of 2005.  The goals of this bill included 
preventing the displacement of American workers, and increasing the 
monitoring and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Labor over the H-
1B and L-1 visa programs.
64
  Congress did not pass either bill. 
Another effort to weed out systemic fraud in the H-1B visa program 
was considered by the 110th Congress in the Secure Borders, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007.
65
  In addition to 
increasing the H-1B visa cap,
66
 the bill set forth a number of restrictions on 
the H-1B program.  These restrictions included eliminating “dual intent” 
for H-1B non-immigrants to prevent H-1B workers from seeking 
permanent resident status in the U.S.,
67
 subjecting employers to more 
demanding rules,
68
 and increasing H-1B application fees.
69
  Congress did 
not pass this bill. 
B.   The H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act 
Senators Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) 
proposed the H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 2007 
during the 110th Congress.
70
  Although the bill never made it out of 
committee, it was re-proposed by the Senators during the 111th Congress 
as the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009.
71
  
The Durbin-Grassley bill attempts to reform the H-1B program so as 
to prevent abuse and fraud, and to protect American workers.
72
  In 
introducing the bill, Senator Durbin remarked: 
The H-1B visa program should complement the U.S. workforce, 
not replace it. . . .  Congress created the H-1B visa program so an 
employer could hire a foreign guest-worker when a qualified 
 
 63. Id. at §§ 8-10. 
 64. H.R. 3322, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 65. S. 1639, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 66. Id. at Title IV, § 419(a)(1). 
 67. Id. at § 218B. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. S. 1035, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 71. S. 887, 111th Cong. (2009).  In this paper, I also use the term “Durbin-Grassley 
bill” to refer to this legislation.  With the closing of the 111th Congress, the bill had not 
been brought up for a vote.  It remains to be seen whether it will be reintroduced in the 
112th Congress. 
 72. The bill also proposes reform of the L-1 program.  L-1 visas allow foreign 
specialized workers to relocate to a corporation‟s U.S. office after working abroad for the 
company for at least one year prior to the grant of L-1 status. 
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American worker could not be found.  However, the H-1B visa 
program is plagued with fraud and abuse and is now a vehicle for 
outsourcing that deprives qualified American workers of their 
jobs.  Our bill will put a stop to the outsourcing of American jobs 
and discrimination against American workers.
73
 
Included within the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009 are a 
multitude of provisions that strive to protect American workers.  Examples 
of such provisions include:  (1) a requirement that all employers (not only 
those that are H-1B dependent) that want to hire an H-1B worker first make 
a good-faith attempt to recruit a qualified American worker;
74
 (2) a 
prohibition on the practice of “H-1B only ads”;
75
 and (3) a bar on 
companies with more than fifty U.S. employees from getting any additional 
work visas if more than 50% of their U.S. workforce consists of H-1B or L-
1 visa holders—the so-called “50/50 provision.”
76
  The 50/50 provision is 
one of the most controversial aspects of the bill, and has aroused outcry 
from non-U.S. outsourcing companies that hire skilled workers from 
abroad.
77
  Critics of the provision argue that the legislation would 
essentially prevent large outsourcing companies from hiring more foreign 
workers to work in the U.S.  As Natarajan Chandrasekaran, chief executive 
officer of Tata Consultancy, an Indian information technology outsourcing 
company, puts it:  “It certainly does surprise us that the U.S., being so 
capitalist, is now going in the opposite direction[.]”
78
  If the bill passes in 
its current form, outsourcers may turn to off-shoring their work as an 
alternative to hiring more American employees.
79
 
According to a study conducted by researchers at Duke and Harvard 
Universities that was released March 2, 2009, changes in the rules 
governing the hiring process for H-1B workers may have a negative impact 
 
 73. Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin, Grassley Introduce Legislation to 
Reform H-1B Visa Program (Apr. 23, 2009), available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseId=311910. 
 74. S. 887, at § 101. 
 75. Id. at § 102. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Foreign outsourcing firms, such as Wipro and Infosys Technologies, are among the 
most active participants in the H-1B visa program.  With 1,964 H-1B visas in 2009, Wipro 
garnered more of these visas from USCIS than any other company, domestic or foreign.  
Wipro Tops List of H-1B Visa Professionals in 2009, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/services/travel/visa-
power/Wipro-tops-list-of-H-1B-visa-professionals-in-2009/articleshow/5415615.cms. 
 78. Moira Herbst, Work Visa Bill Threatens Indian Outsourcers, BUSINESS WEEK 
ONLINE (June 3, 2009), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2009/db2009062_581634.htm. 
 79. Id. 
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on innovation in the United States.
80
  Vivek Wadhwa, the lead researcher 
on the study, has been highly critical of restrictions on the H-1B program, 
particularly those contained in the Durbin-Grassley bill.  According to 
Wadhwa, “[t]o put up walls that block the best and brightest from coming 
to America is bad policy in both the short and the long term[,]” which is 
exactly what he perceives the legislation will do.
81
 
In addition to the provisions intended to protect the American 
workforce, the H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act contains a number of 
provisions that increase the DOL‟s monitoring authority.  For example, the 
bill would expand the Department‟s ability to review H-1B visa 
applications.  In its current form, the INA permits the Secretary of Labor to 
review applications only for “completeness and obvious inaccuracies.”
82
  
The Durbin-Grassley bill would extend review of an application to include 
both fraud and misrepresentations of material fact.
83
  If, upon reviewing the 
application, the Secretary “identifies clear indicators of fraud or 
misrepresentation of material fact, the Secretary may conduct an 
investigation[.]”
84
 
The H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act would allow the DOL to conduct 
random audits of any company that employs H-1B non-immigrants.
85
  
Additionally, the DOL would be required to conduct annual compliance 
audits of companies that employ large numbers of H-1B workers—those 
with more than one-hundred U.S.-based employees, of which more than 
15% of such employees are H-1B visa holders.
86
  In order to facilitate the 
DOL‟s ability to perform these functions, the bill authorizes an additional 
two-hundred DOL employees to be responsible for administering, 
overseeing, investigating, and enforcing guest worker programs such as the 
H-1B.
87
  Hence, with this reform act in place, the federal government‟s role 
in weeding out fraud and abuse in the H-1B program would be significantly 
expanded. 
 
 80. Vivek Wadhwa et al., America’s Loss is the World’s Gain 7 (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/americas_loss.pdf. 
 81. Vivek Wadhwa, We Need Smarter, Not Fewer, H-1B Visas, BUSINESS WEEK 
ONLINE, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2009/tc20090511_939248.htm. 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G) (2006). 
 83. S. 887, 111th Cong. § 103. 
 84. Id.  This is an expansion of the DOL‟s investigatory power, which is currently 
limited to situations in which a complaint has been filed.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(A) (2006). 
 85. S. 887, at § 111. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at § 124. 
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C.   The Debate Over the Cap 
Although the Durbin-Grassley bill in its current form does not focus 
on the annual H-1B visa cap, many other proposals aimed at reforming the 
system focus precisely on this issue.  On one side of the debate are those 
who believe that “the U.S. labor market is suffering at the hands of the H-
1B visa cap, putting U.S. jobs at risk to off-shoring and putting the United 
States in danger of losing its most valuable resource in the twenty-first 
century, intellectual capital.”
88
  In other words, the cap should be raised to 
permit “the best and brightest” to come to the United States, which will in 
turn promote and preserve America‟s status as an innovator on the world 
stage.
89
 
On the other side of the debate are those who advocate lowering the 
cap.  The arguments on this side are traditionally based on the belief that H-
1B workers displace American workers.  Additionally, it has been 
contended that the real reason behind the IT industry‟s support of an 
increase in the cap is its desire for a constant source of cheap labor.  
Raising the cap would thus serve to feed the industry‟s perverse 
incentives.
90
  A paper by Harvard Professor George J. Borjas for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research revealed that an “immigrant-
induced 10 percent increase in the size of a skill group lowers the wage of 
native workers in that group by 3 to 4 percent.”
91
  As Kim Berry, president 
of the Programmers Guild, puts it: 
Raising the cap would be a boon for Indian bodyshops. . . .  
These firms produce nothing of value while they undercut U.S. 
wages. . . .  They are corrupting the supply and demand of the 
tech labor market and dissuading future generations from 
entering the field.
92
 
Many on this side of the debate also take issue with their opponents‟ 
 
 88. See Cromwell, supra note 30, at 465 (advocating an increase in the H-1B visa cap). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work 
Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 817 (2003) 
(suggesting that finding a source of cheap labor is an employer‟s primary motive in hiring 
an H-1B worker). 
 91. George J. Borjas, The Labor Market Impact of High-skill Immigration 2 n.2 (Nat‟l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11217, 2005), available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/Papers/w11217.pdf. 
 92. Moira Herbst, Another Wave of H-1Bs on the Way, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 
31, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2008/db20080330_182808.htm.  
The Programmers Guild is an organization devoted to advancing the interests of technical 
and professional workers in the information technology fields. 
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view that H-1B workers are the world‟s best and brightest.  Ron Hira, an 
associate professor of public policy at Rochester Institute of Technology 
and an expert on outsourcing, has tried to dispel what he perceives to be an 
inaccurate conception of H-1B worker talent:  “While some are truly 
exceptional, they make up a small share of the visa holders.  The minimum 
degree required to hold an H-1B visa is a bachelor‟s degree or equivalent 
experience, hardly a rare commodity.”
93
 
D.   Additional Obstacles for H-1B Employers 
In addition to political pressure, a persistently weak U.S. economy has 
presented challenges for the H-1B program.  While employers scooped up 
the 65,000 visas available in just one day, as of September 25, 2009, nearly 
six months after the government began accepting applications for fiscal 
year 2010, only 46,700 applications had been filed.
94
  It was not until 
December 21, 2009 that USCIS announced that it had received a sufficient 
number of H-1B petitions to reach the statutory cap for fiscal year 2010.
95
  
Another deterrent for some companies seeking to hire H-1B employees is a 
recent increase in filing fees.  In August 2010, President Obama signed into 
law Public Law 111-230, which increases H-1B filing fees by $2000 for 
employers with a workforce of fifty or more employees in the United 
States, at least 50% of whom are H-1B or L-1 non-immigrants.
96
 
 
 93. Ron Hira, It’s Time to Overhaul H-1B Visas, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 13, 2009, at 63, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_15/b4126063331942.htm 
[hereinafter Hira I]. 
 94. Miriam Jordan, Slump Sinks Visa Program, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 
2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125677268735914549.html. 
Applications for the following fiscal year can be filed as early as April.  Hence, employers 
began applying for H-1B visas in April of 2009 for the 2010 fiscal year. 
 95. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Reaches FY 2010 
H-1B Cap (Dec. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=153a1638367b5210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=68439c7755
cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.  As of November 5, 2010, the cap for fiscal year 
2011 still had not been reached.  H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Cap Season, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=4b7cdd1d5fd37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=73566811264
a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD. 
 96. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Implements H-1B 
and L-1 Fee Increase According to Public Law 111-230 (Aug. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=27eac9514bb8a210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=68439c7755c
b9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.  The law also implements an additional $2250 fee 
for L-1 petitions. 
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An additional hurdle for companies seeking to hire H-1B visa workers 
is the Employ American Workers Act (“EAWA”), a provision included in 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the “stimulus bill”), which 
was signed into law by President Obama in February 2009.
97
  EAWA 
prohibits a company receiving funding through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (“TARP”) to hire an H-1B worker without first certifying that no 
qualified American worker has been, or will be, displaced and that the 
company made affirmative efforts to first find a qualified American worker 
for the job.
98
  EAWA has caused many financial institutions, most notably 
Bank of America, to retract some job offers to foreign hires.
99
  Remarking 
on EAWA and what he views as a growing anti-immigrant sentiment, 
Vivek Wadhwa said:  “The best and the brightest who would normally 
come here are saying, „Why do we need to go to a country where we are 
not welcome, where our quality of life would be less, and we would be at 
the bottom of the social ladder?‟”
100
  Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of 
Goldman Sachs, was similarly skeptical about the new requirements: 
[R]ecent legislation constrains the ability of financial institutions 
to hire employees through the H-1B visa program.  This program 
helps bring the most highly trained and technical people into our 
labor market.  The U.S. has always been a magnet for many of 
the most talented, hungry and qualified people in the world.  
Especially at this time in our economy, do we really want to tell 
individuals who will help companies to grow and innovate—
ultimately creating more jobs—that they should go work 
elsewhere?
101
 
VII.  FIRST STEPS TOWARD A BETTER SYSTEM 
As we have seen in the past, reform proposals that attempt to 
accomplish too much too quickly are unlikely to be successful.  While there 
is general agreement that the H-1B system is an area ripe for reform, there 
is debate over the process by which reform can best be achieved.  In this 
author‟s opinion, it is essential to initiate the reform process with proposals 
that are narrow in scope.  By beginning with smaller issues that are more 
likely to garner political consensus, the likelihood of achieving larger and 
more comprehensive reform will be increased. 
 
 97. Pub. L. No. 111-5, Div. A, Title XVI, § 1611, 123 Stat. 115, 305. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Jordan, supra note 94, at A1. 
 100. Id. at A2. 
 101. Greg Morcroft, Full text of Goldman Sachs CEO speech, MARKETWATCH, Apr. 7, 
2009, available at http://photos.wsj.net/story/text-goldman-sachs-ceo-lloyd. 
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The H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009 is an example of a 
resolution that strives to achieve too much in a single piece of legislation.  
Reforms implemented by the bill cover a wide spectrum of issues, ranging 
from application requirements to governmental authority.  Because the 
legislation is broad in scope, it is likely to face political opposition in 
Congress, and may suffer the same fate as many other attempts to reform 
the H-1B visa program. 
Additionally, the H-1B visa cap should be an issue dealt with only 
after the initial foundation for reform has been laid.  The issue of the cap 
generates abundant political, social, and economic debate, as previously 
discussed in Part VI.  Therefore, prior to implementing changes to the cap, 
Congress should focus on issues more likely to generate consensus.  One 
such issue involves increasing the DOL‟s authority to regulate the H-1B 
program. 
Augmenting the federal government‟s oversight and investigative 
authority is a key component of H-1B visa reform.  According to Ron Hira, 
“[t]he H-1B program can be cleaned up by closing loopholes and 
increasing oversight.”
102
  Many of the Durbin-Grassley proposals are on-
target in this regard.  For example, the Durbin-Grassley bill would expand 
the DOL‟s ability to review H-1B visa applications, extending review of an 
application to include both fraud and misrepresentations of material fact.
103
  
Upon a finding of fraud or misrepresentation, the DOL would be permitted 
to initiate an investigation.
104
  Additionally, the bill would allow the DOL 
to conduct random audits of any company that employs H-1B non-
immigrants, and require the Department to conduct annual audits of 
companies employing significant numbers of H-1B workers.
105
  To 
facilitate the performance of these functions, the DOL can hire an 
additional two-hundred employees.
106
 
In order to implement a more effective oversight mechanism, the DOL 
will need increased discretionary budget authority.  I propose a 
supplemental tax, to be paid for by those companies whose H-1B visa 
workers make up more than a certain percent of the total workforce 
(percent to be determined on the basis of research and expert testimony).  
This tax will effectively serve to finance the increased spending 
requirements.  Giving the DOL greater latitude to regulate the H-1B 
program is an essential component of successful reform.  Instead of relying 
on various governmental authorities to come in and conduct investigations 
 
 102. Hira I, supra note 93, at 64. 
 103. S. 887, 111th Cong. § 103. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at § 111. 
 106. Id. at § 124. 
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after alleged fraudulent activity has already occurred,
107
 we can preempt 
fraud ex ante by empowering the DOL with greater oversight capability.  
Additionally, increased funding will permit more on-site visits to ensure 
that both employers and employees comply with legal requirements.  On-
site visits will assist in combating a major flaw in the H-1B system, which 
entails a relatively stringent initial verification process offset by a lack of 
oversight once the H-1B employee has entered the country.  Since fraud 
often becomes apparent only after the application process has been 
completed,
108
 random site visits to ensure that H-1B participants are 
complying with the rules are an important component of comprehensive 
reform. 
Current government policies deter H-1B workers from reporting 
wrongful practices engaged in by their employers.  When an employee 
comes to the U.S. on an H-1B visa, the visa is held by the employer, not the 
worker.  If the employee complains, the company can terminate its visa 
sponsorship and the worker must then leave the country.  Although a 
terminated employee can remain in the U.S. if he is granted permanent 
citizenship, this process may take up to ten years and is ordinarily not a 
viable alternative.  As Michael F. Brown, an attorney in Wisconsin who 
handles immigration cases, says, “[M]any of these people don‟t know their 
rights. . . .  They‟re essentially captives.”
109
 
This situation will likely continue unless the extraordinary power 
wielded by employers of H-1B workers in the current system is curtailed.  
If employers are holding the visas for the workers, and have complete 
discretion over whether and when to apply for permanent resident status for 
those workers, they are essentially able to keep their employees “captive.”  
The current system frequently puts guest workers who want to become 
permanent residents “in a state of indentured limbo.”
110
  A possible 
resolution is a power-shift from employer to employee:  the employee 
could hold the visa herself and independently apply for permanent 
residency. 
Employers have lobbied hard against allowing H-1B workers to 
 
 107. See Herbst, supra note 54 (discussing a federal probe into H-1B visa fraud, which 
resulted in the indictment of information technology services firm Vision Systems Group). 
 108. See H-1B BENEFIT FRAUD & COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT (Sept. 2008), supra note 36 
(citing examples of fraud in the H-1B system, including petitions from businesses that do 
not exist, employers paying less than the required prevailing wage, and visa holders working 
a different job than was stated in the petition). 
 109. Hamm and Herbst, supra note 49, at 38. 
 110. Ron Hira, Bridge to Immigration or Cheap Temporary Labor? The H-1B & L-1 
Visa Programs Are a Source of Both, 257 ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER 13 (Feb. 17, 
2009), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/60b75ba377ebc081b5_hem6b5qjc.pdf [hereinafter 
Hira II]. 
ROSENBAUMFINALIZED_SIX_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2011  9:12 PM 
2011] H-1B VISA FRAUD 815 
 
 
sponsor themselves for permanent resident status, and thus far they have 
been successful.  During the 2007 debate over comprehensive immigration 
reform, businesses fought hard against a proposal to allocate self-sponsored 
high-skill immigrant visas based on a merit point system, arguing that 
employers are best equipped to select the talent that is needed in the 
country.
111
  In spite of these protestations, however, limiting employers‟ 
control over the H-1B process is precisely what is needed if the system is to 
be effectively reformed.  While a merit-based point system may not be an 
ideal solution, reform that makes the path to permanent residency easier for 
employees is essential.  Regarding this issue, Ron Hira contends:  “When 
employers need skilled foreign workers, they should rely primarily on 
permanent immigration to supply them.  Guest worker visa programs 
should be relied on only when truly necessary and should be significantly 
overhauled to ensure that foreign workers cannot be exploited and 
American workers are not undercut.”
112
 
In order to curb employer abuse and assist the DOL in regulating the 
H-1B program, a whistleblower mechanism should be implemented.  A law 
simulating the Whistleblower Protection Act would encourage employees 
to inform the DOL of their employers‟ abuse of the H-1B system, without 
fear of repercussion.
113
  This policy would be an effective tool in combating 
violations by smaller companies, such as body shops.  Because of their 
size, body shops frequently escape the purview of regulators and law 
enforcement; they are, so-to-speak, “under the radar.”  While preventing 
visa abuses by these companies is labor intensive, the combination of 
increased DOL oversight authority and whistleblower protection for 
employees will make the task feasible. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As articulated in this Comment, the H-1B program is riddled with 
violations, the effects of which are both far-reaching and devastating.  If 
comprehensive reform is not achieved immediately, America‟s position as 
a world innovator in the economic, social, and technological realms will 
surely erode.  Reform can begin by taking small steps that have the 
 
 111. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske and Jim Puzzanghera, Immigration Plan Doesn’t Add 
up, Critics Say: Businesses Fault the Senate Bill’s Point System, Saying It Can’t Keep Pace 
with the Changing Economy, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 24, 2007, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/24/nation/na-points24 (discussing a Senate proposal to 
implement a point-based system that would be used to allocate green cards). 
 112. Hira II, supra note 110, at 13. 
 113. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) 
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (providing statutory protection for federal 
employees who report illegal or improper government activities). 
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potential to make a big impact, as discussed in Part VII.  Regulation 
through oversight and a whistleblower system are just some of the changes 
that should be implemented if H-1B visa fraud is to be scaled back 
significantly, and eventually eliminated.  Salvation of the H-1B visa 
program is possible with appropriate reform.  A sound program, checked 
and balanced, would set the stage for legitimate and fair labor practices that 
will benefit American workers and their foreign counterparts alike. 
